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The far right typically performs worse in local elections than in national ones. We propose
that a key reason for this underperformance is the difference in how intergroup attitudes
manifest and are informed in local and national settings. We document the existence of a
local-national gap in intergroup attitudes through survey experiments and open-ended
survey questions that randomly vary whether study-participants are asked about the
national or the local setting. In the first experiment, we find a substantial local-national gap,
where the influx of refugees during the refugee crisis was seen as instigating changes in the
national setting, but rarely locally. In the second experiment, we investigate the perceived
amount and nature of public discussions about refugees and immigration. We again find a
substantial local-national gap. Compared to discussions in the local setting, there is a
perception of more discussion in the national setting, and the nature of those discussions
are perceived as more heated, conflictual, and biased than local discussions. We also find
a local-national gap in information sources about refugees and immigration in a final study.
In local questions, native citizens are more likely to rely on everyday experiences and social
networks. In national questions, they are more likely to rely on media representations.
These local-national gaps are seen in urban, suburban, and rural areas. Importantly, we
also find the gap among respondents who had an asylum seeker center established in their
local community recently. The local-national gaps in intergroup attitudes revealed here can
account for patterns in far-right electoral performance that so far have remained puzzling,
and they deserve further attention in future research both in political science and social
psychology.
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INTRODUCTION
How come far-right parties are less successful electorally in local elections than in national ones? This
is a puzzle that has received less attention than it deserves in the now voluminous literature on the far
right, (e.g., Mudde, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2018; Ivarsflaten et al., 2019). In
studies focused on national elections, it is now agreed that intergroup attitudes, and in particular
opposition to immigration and policies to help the inclusion of immigrant-origin minorities, are
central to voters of the far right (de Lange, 2007; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Ivarsflaten and Sniderman, 2021).
Here we argue that to account for the local-national gap in far-right electoral outcomes we need to
take into consideration an aspect of these intergroup attitudes that so far is not well recognized and
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understood. We will argue that natives relate differently to
questions concerning immigration and immigrants when they
refer to the local community than when the reference point is the
national setting. This is, we propose, a missing link in existing
theories that seek to explain the observed local-national gap in
electoral outcomes for the far right.
We show that there exists a substantial local-national gap in
public opinion about immigrants and immigration in three
survey experiments conducted in the aftermath of the 2015
European refugee crisis. The first experiment focuses on
perceptions of change as a result of a sudden influx of
refugees with reference to either the country or to the local
community. The second study investigates perceptions about
the public debate concerning refugees and immigration either
in the national or the local setting. The third experiment asks
about sources of information in questions related to refugees and
immigration and varies whether the question references the
country or the local community. Across all three experiments
we find large and robust local-national gaps consistent with the
account we advance.
THE PUZZLE
There is by now an extensive line of research on the far right and
their voters (Norris and Inglehart, 2018; Ivarsflaten et al., 2019;
Kriesi et al., 2008; Mudde, 2007; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995).
Nearly all of it, even the studies that examine sub-national
variation, focuses on outcomes of national elections. Some
have noted that breakthroughs for the far right often have
occurred first in second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt,
1980), whether local or to the European Parliament.
Nevertheless, studies of far-right outcomes in local elections
are sparse. The local-national gap in intergroup attitudes that
is the focus of attention in this study is not widely known or
studied in the literature and hence its possible implications for
far-right electoral performance has not previously been
highlighted.
Table 1 shows that the far right consistently under-performed
in local elections compared to national ones in the four largest
Nordic countries—Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland. We
focus on these countries for a number of reasons. First, this is a
part of Europe where the far right has been particularly successful
in national elections. The success came first in Denmark and
Norway, where the parties were formed in the early 1970s, but the
far right has for the last 15 or so years been strongly prevalent also
in Sweden and Finland. Second, the local-national gaps in
electoral outcomes are comparable in these countries because
of their similar party and election systems (Lipset and Rokkan,
1967; Bentsson et al., 2013). Also, since the party systems are
nationalized and the state systems are unitary in all these Nordic
countries, local elections are simultaneous and country wide. This
facilitates comparison of national and local results. The survey
experimental results to be reported below are conducted in one of
these Nordic countries, Norway. The far right in Norway is fully
institutionalized. In national elections it has been the country´s
third largest party since the 1990s and onwards. It served in
national government from 2013 to 2019. While some far-right
parties may suffer local-national gaps in electoral performance
simply because they are new and hence not fully institutionalized,
this is not the case in the Norwegian context, which is the main
empirical focus in this article.
Table 1 covers the four most recent elections in each
country—two national and two local ones. In Sweden, local
and national elections are held simultaneously. In all the other
countries they are asynchronous. The two first columns list the
official results for the national and local elections respectively.
The last column displays the average local-national gap in far-
right electoral performance. The average gaps are calculated as
the difference between the results of the two national elections
(averaged) and the two local elections (averaged), for each
country. All gaps are positive and larger than zero, which
means that the far right in all countries on average performed
better in national than in local elections. The size of this difference
is around 5 percentage points, which is considerable, since the
election results for these far-right parties do not rise above 21.1
percent in any of the elections covered in Table 1.1 It is also worth
noting that the local-national gap in aggregate electoral
performance is at least as large in the countries where the far
right is fully institutionalized (Norway and Denmark, and
arguably also in Finland) as in the countries where they are
not fully so (most clearly in Sweden). Elsewhere in Europe there
are similarly examples of fully institutionalized far-right parties,
(e.g. in Austria and Switzerland) and more recently established
and therefore not fully institutionalized such parties, (e.g. in
Germany and the Netherlands).
THE FAR RIGHT AND INTERGROUP
ATTITUDES
Voting for the far right is strongly related to intergroup
attitudes, more specifically what has been called nativism. In
the standard text on the ideology of the far right in Europe,
TABLE 1 | The local-national gap in election results for the Nordic far right. Official
results from the two most recent national and local elections.
National Local Average gap
% % (National–Local)
Norway (2017; 2019) 15.2 8.2
Norway (2013; 2015) 16.3 11.4 6.0
Sweden (2018) 17.5 12.7
Sweden (2014) 12.9 9.3 4.2
Denmark (2019; 2017) 8.7 8.7
Denmark (2015; 2013) 21.1 10.1 5.5
Finland (2019; 2017) 17.5 8.8
Finland (2015; 2012) 17.7 12.3 7.1
1The far-right parties in these four countries at this point in time were: The
Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) in Norway; the Danish People’s Party (Dansk
Folkeparti) in Denmark; the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) in Sweden;
the (True) Finns’ Party (Perussoumalaiset) in Finland.
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Mudde (2007, p. 19) defines nativism as “an ideology, which
holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of
the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements
(persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the
homogenous nation-state”.
There is no doubt that nativism is a potent force in today’s
Europe. In the case of the Brexit referendum, where a majority
voted to leave the European Union, studies have shown that
concern over border control, of keeping immigrants and refugees
out, was one of the reasons people voted as they did (Hobolt,
2016; Sobolewska and Ford, 2020). And while the particularities
of the United Kingdom’s situation are singular, there are
similarities elsewhere. In the United States, President Trump
won enough votes for a majority in the electoral college after a
campaign in 2016, which echoed the slogans of far-right parties in
Europe in calling for “America First.” “France d’abord” had for
decades been the rallying cry of the National Front in France as it
had of the Austrian Freedom Party, “Österreich zuerst” (Rydgren,
2005; Mudde, 2007; Ivarsflaten et al., 2019). In Norway,
Denmark, Italy, Finland, Flanders, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands, far-right parties have been in or exercised
substantial influence over governments for more than a decade
already. Sweden and Germany appeared for a long time to be
exceptions to the rule of the surge of the far right, but in recent
years we have seen the establishment and growth of powerful
such parties also there—Sverigedemokraterna andDie Alternative
für Deutschland.
Just like the literature focusing on the far-right parties
themselves and their ideologies, studies of voter patterns have
repeatedly underscored the importance of nativist attitudes for
far-right voters (Carter, 2005; de Lange, 2007; Ivarsflaten, 2008;
Norris and Inglehart, 2018). This series of studies, and several
others, have shown that voters who favor a liberal approach to
border control and asylum and those who support inclusionary
minority policies more generally are highly unlikely to vote for
the far right. By contrast those who favor strict immigration and
refugee policies and those who support exclusionary policies
toward immigrant-origin minorities are more likely to vote for
the far right, especially if they attach high salience to this area of
politics. In other words, there is a strong link between
exclusionary intergroup attitudes and the likelihood of voting
for the far right.
INTERGROUP ATTITUDES IN LOCAL
SETTINGS
Immigration politics is central both on the national political stage
and in local political debates (Scalise and Burroni, 2020). For
example, the admission and distribution of asylum seekers is one
issue which puts immigration on the agenda in local politics
(Blommaert et al., 2003; Zorlu 2016; Bygnes 2020). Scholars have
described asylum accommodation at the local level as a
“battleground” where the migration process is managed by
local political and administrative authorities and agencies
(Campomori and Ambrosini, 2020). Local authorities and
cities may implement immigration and settlement polices
which diverge from those at the national level. For example,
we have seen the creation of so-called “solidarity cities” in Europe
or “sanctuary cities” in North-America and the United Kingdom
(Jørgensen, 2012; Barber, 2013; Augustin and Jørgensen, 2019).
The research documenting the centrality of local experiences in
the field of immigration politics deepens the puzzle of the local-
national gap in election results for the far right. Why when
nativism is so important to the far-right vote, does the far-right
underperform where natives and newcomers live their everyday
lives together?
THE LOCAL-NATIONAL GAP IN
INTERGROUP ATTITUDES
We propose that an important missing piece in explanations of
the local-national gap in far-right electoral performance is to be
found through an improved model of intergroup attitudes. More
specifically, we hypothesize that there are systematic differences
in intergroup attitudes dependent on whether citizens’ focus on
the national or the local setting. In the study of intergroup
relations, this idea is not new but extends from an insight well
known and described in the classic work by Herbert Blumer.
Already in 1958, he pointed out the difference between
individuals’ concrete lived experiences of intergroup contact in
everyday life and the abstract image created of “the others”
through collective and mediated public discourse. Addressing
racial prejudice, Blumer wrote:
. . .the building of the image of the abstract group takes
place in the area of the remote and not of the near. It is
not the experience with concrete individuals in daily
association that gives rise to the definitions of the
extended, abstract group. Such immediate experience
is usually regulated and orderly. Even where such
immediate experience is disrupted the new definitions
which are formed are limited to the individuals involved.
The collective image of the abstract group grows up not
by generalizing from experiences gained in close, first-
hand contacts but through the transcending
characterizations that are made of the group as an
entity (Blumer, 1958, p.6, p.6)
Applying Blumer’s argument to the puzzle at hand, we argue
that public views about local manifestations of immigration (as an
issue “in the near”) are distinct from views on immigration as a
national phenomenon (an issue “in the far”). Whereas the former
is likely to be grounded in local experiences, the latter is
predominately informed by the construction of the issue in
the media and more broadly in the national public arena. In
more recent work on construal-level theory, similar ideas are
central. The distinction is usually referred to as that between low
and high levels of construal, where the low level roughly
corresponds to issues “in the near” (Hess et al., 2018). It
follows from this line of thinking that citizens´ attitudes to
immigration and immigrant-origin minorities as a local and a
national phenomenon may well diverge.
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If there are systematic differences in the public´s views on
immigration-related phenomena in local and national settings,
this can account for the observed local-national gap in far-right
voting. An example of how a local-national gap would manifest
and result in a premium on far-right electoral outcomes at the
national level is the following: If immigrant-origin minority
presence does not disrupt everyday lives considerably in the
local setting, reactions may well be muted and concerns not
spurred about immigration and immigrants when the focus is on
the local community. By contrast, concerns may be strong if the
focus is instead on the national setting, especially if national
public debates and media coverage about immigration and
immigrants are politicized and heated. And, according to this
line of thinking, such local-national gaps in intergroup attitudes
should be observable irrespective of the nature of the local
community—whether it is urban or rural or has extensive
experience accommodating newcomers or not. As Blumer
(1958) pointed out, people’s everyday intergroup interactions
in the near may well be positive, while at the same time views of
out-groups can remain negative in the far.2
APPROACH AND DATA
Empirically, we address a straight-forward question. Do citizens
relate differently to immigration-related phenomena in local and
national settings? Survey experiments are ideally suited for
learning the answer to this question. They allow us to examine
citizen opinion on immigration-related issues, while randomly
varying, between subjects, only which setting is in focus3. This
procedure enables observation of the hypothesized local-national
gap directly, without confounders or consistency bias. Moreover,
since the experiments are embedded in a larger survey, we will
examine whether the local-national gap appears across citizens
living in different types of local settings—urban, suburban, and
rural, and having different experiences of immigrant settlement
in their own communities.
We fielded three survey experiments using this procedure.
They followed the same basic template. The participants were
randomized into two experimental groups and received the same
survey question. In all three cases the experimental “treatment”
was the same. Only one small, but for our purposes all-important,
part of the question differed between groups. One group was
asked about the issue in the far—the national setting is in focus.
The other group was asked about the issue in the near—the local
setting is in focus.4
The studies were conducted in the aftermath of the 2015
refugee crisis and we first focus on perception of change due to
the crisis. Our data was collected in Norway, one of the major
receiving countries within the EEA in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016). A
recent qualitative study from Norwegian local communities
during the refugee crisis showed that people reported fewer
negative experiences resulting from the establishment of ASCs
than anticipated before the asylum seekers arrived (Bygnes,
2020). This finding spurred our interest in how people
perceive change depending on whether they focus on the
national or local setting. In Experiment 1, we asked “As you
see it, has something changed in [your local community/Norway]
as a result of the 2015 refugee crisis?” The participants could
answer either yes or no.
Next, we examined the local-national gap in public discussions
concerning refugees and immigrants. We asked our respondents
to evaluate the amount and nature of discussion on refugees and
immigration focusing either on Norway or on their local
community. We asked: “How much would you say that issues
relating to refugees and immigration are discussed in [Norway/
your local community] these days?” Responses were given on a
five-point scale ranging from 1 “very little” to 5 “very much.”
Next, we asked the participants to describe the nature of
discussions: “How would you characterize the discussions
about refugees and immigration in [Norway/your local
community]?” followed by four seven-point semantic
differential scales (calm–heated; objective–non-objective;
solution-oriented–a source of conflict; and interesting–boring).
Finally, in Experiment 3, we asked respondents for their
sources of information about refugees and immigration.5
Participants were asked “How do you get information about
refugees and immigration in [Norway/your local community]?
They were instructed to reply in their own words.6 Their answers
2Additionally, of course, it is important to highlight that national and local
governments have different jurisdictions. The issue of border control is mainly
a national issue and in so far as immigration and immigrants are debated and
perceived mainly as an issue of border control, voters may perceive immigration to
be less salient in local politics than at the national level. Difference in the salience of
the immigration issue in national and local politics is also likely a part of the
explanation for the observed local-national gap in far-right electoral performance.
What we additionally show is that even when salience is held constant in a series of
survey experiments, voters still relate differently to immigration-related
phenomena in local and national settings.
3This type of survey experiments, where respondents are randomly assigned to
answering survey items that are the same except for one or a few words are not
intended to demonstrate that a treatment can change respondents minds. Rather,
they are designed to reveal aspects of public opinion that are otherwise hidden or
hard to observe (see e.g., Sniderman, 2018 for an overview of the uses of this
approach to survey experiments). Because of the carefully controlled question
format and the random assignment to either local or national conditions, the
survey experiments presented here show more conclusively than other types of
survey designs that altering the context from local to national—and nothing
else—results in the substantial differences in intergroup attitudes documented.
4We employed two different conceptualizations of the local level: the
administrative term “municipality” and the respondent-defined “local
community.” Norwegian municipalities vary greatly in geographical size and
population, and are not equivalent to a single local community. As stated by
Wong, Bowers, Williams, and Simmons (2012, p. 1153) “peoples’ perceptions of
their environment do not resemble governmental units.” In this paper, our focus is
on respondents’ perceptions of their local community.
5Experiments 2 and 3 were nested, meaning that respondents were randomized
into either the national or the local condition for all questions. This was done to
strengthen the experimental stimulus and prevent respondent confusion by
providing a consistent focus on either the local or the national setting in a set
of related questions. Experiments 2 and 3 were fully independent from experiment
1, which was fielded on a separate wave of the survey.
6Three open boxes were provided to encourage respondents to report more than
one source. Most respondents did so.
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were coded based on a template developed from a previous study
carried out in the United States which similarly used an open-
ended survey format to document differences in source of
information relevant to the formation of intergroup attitudes
across different geographic units (Wong et al., 2012).
Data was collected in the Norwegian Citizen Panel (Ivarsflaten
and team, 2018), a research-purpose online panel owned by the
University of Bergen in June 2018 (Wave 12) and October 2018
(Wave 13). Participants in the NCP were recruited in waves 1, 3,
8, and 11 based on random samples drawn from the National
Population Registry. The samples were limited to individuals
aged 18 or older, with a current home address in Norway.
Response rates for initial recruitment to the panel ranged from
15.1 to 23.0%, whereas the response rate among panel
participants was 70.5 and 74.6 percent in waves 12 and 13,
respectively. Compared to the population, there is some
underrepresentation of individuals with lower levels of
education, especially men, and younger respondents in the
NCP. There are also some deviations from the population
based on geographic region. These deviations are not a major
concern for the study at hand since its main purpose is to
investigate local-national gaps in responses from respondents
in randomly created experimental groups. The total number of
participants, the number of valid cases and the demographic
characteristics of the samples are reported in Table 2.
The NCP is organized in such a way that all participants
answer some identical core questions, and are randomized into
representative subpanels that focus on specific topics, (e.g.
immigration, climate change, or health). With the exception of
Experiment 1, which was run in two subpanels, the experiments
were embedded in one subpanel of the NCP. Experiment 1 was
included in wave 12 (June 2018), whereas Experiments 2 and 3
were included in wave 13 (October-November 2018).
RESULTS
Experiment 1. Perceived Changes due to
the Refugee Crisis
In our first experiment, we asked about perceived changes
resulting from the refugee crisis. In accordance with the
procedure described above we randomly assigned half of the
respondents to answer this question with reference to the
country. The other half was asked about the local setting.
Figure 1 shows the main results from this survey experiment.
It reveals an extraordinarily large local-national gap in responses.
When their focus was on the national setting—the question “in
the far”–as many as 71% of respondents7 perceived changes as a
result of the refugee crisis. By contrast, as few as 27% perceived
changes when their focus was on the local setting—the question
“in the near.” This is not a narrow local-national gap, it is a wide
gulf. A vast majority perceive change to have occurred when we
ask them to focus on the country. Only a small minority perceive
this change when we put focus on the local community.
Could the local-national gulf in this question be driven by the
fact that urban local communities are more diverse and that their
inhabitants may perceive less change, at least locally, as a result of
an influx of additional refugees than would inhabitants of less
diverse (often rural) communities? The argument we have
proposed implies that the local-national gap should be present
across all types of communities even if the size of the gap may
vary for reasons such as those mentioned. Therefore, if we were to
find that the local-national gap is present, for example in urban
communities but not in rural ones, this would count as evidence
against the account we have advanced. By contrast, if we find that
the gap is present for respondents living in different kinds of
communities, this would strengthen the proposed account. Since
the first experiment was administered to two different sub-panels,
we have a large enough sample in this case (N  2,849) to conduct
detailed analysis of heterogenous effects across community type.
Figure 2 shows the results of a probit model, where the
likelihood of perceived change is the dependent variable and
experimental treatment and community type are the explanatory
variables (interacted).8 Themain take-away from the figure is that
the local-national gap in perceived change remains sizable in all
types of communities—whether they fit the description of urban,
suburban, town, or rural/village. Interestingly, when the question
is asked with reference to the national setting, levels of perceived
change do not vary significantly across type of community. There
is some indication that inhabitants in the more sparsely
populated communities were somewhat more likely to perceive
changes, but the differences are not statistically significant at
conventional levels. Respondents in all types of communities are
highly likely to have perceived changes when focusing on the
national setting.
When the question is asked about the local setting the main
pattern is again one of similarity across types of communities. In
all community types, only a minority of respondents are likely to
have perceived change when focusing on the local setting. That
noted, there is a difference in the levels of perceived change
between sparsely and densely populated communities that
reaches conventional levels of statistical significance.
Respondents living in more rural communities (towns and
villages) were somewhat more likely to perceive changes in
their local communities as a result of the refugee crisis than
were respondents living in more urban communities (cities and
suburbs). Most importantly, however, any differences between
TABLE 2 | Sample characteristics.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 and 3
N 2950 890
Valid N 2849 803–886
% Women 50.3% 48.4%
Year of birth
1959 or earlier 43.9% 46.5%
1960–1989 47.3% 46.7%
1990 or later 8.7% 6.7%
7The figures contain the confidence intervals around these point-estimates. They
are not repeated in the text to ease reading.
8Full regression results for all figures are reported in the Supplementary Material.
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communities are dwarfed when compared to the local-nation gap,
which is sizable regardless of community type.
The difference seen between sparsely and densely populated
communities in responses to the question “in the near” suggests
that differences in local manifestations of the refugee crisis had
some impact on perceived change. We know that during the
refugee crisis in 2015/16, as many as 259 new asylum reception
centers were established to house asylum applicants. There is
substantial variation in how northern European countries host
and distribute asylum seekers after arrival. In Norway, the
reception and distribution of asylum seekers is handled
centrally by the Directorate of Immigration (UDI). The
specific process by which asylum center locations are chosen is
subject to Norway’s strict rules for public procurement. When
increased ASC capacity is needed, the UDI issues calls for new
centers and different NGOs and private actors make bids to run a
center. As a rule, the bidder who can run a center within the
minimum standards required for the lowest cost is awarded the
contract, but the UDI is required to cooperate closely with local
communities and decision-making bodies.
The unprecedented increase in arrivals during 2015 lead to a
swifter and more chaotic process for establishment of new centers
than usual, and decisions were under substantially less local
influence than what would normally be the case. Most of the
ASCs during the crisis were established in existing buildings, (e.g.
hotels, lodging for workers etc.), for which the owners had all the
necessary permits to provide housing. Because this was done
rapidly in response to an unexpected and large influx of refugees,
many centers were located in more sparsely populated areas
where localities that could be used were available at lower
prices than in the urban and suburban areas.
We naturally expect that respondents who live in local
communities that received new asylum centers during the
refugee crisis are more likely to report that they perceived
change to their local community. Since Experiment 1 was
embedded in a panel, several of our respondents had in
previous waves been asked whether they live in a local
community which received an ASC. We are therefore able to
check if the local-national gap we observed is caused by this key
difference in how the refugee crisis manifested in local
communities.
Figure 3 displays the results of an analysis done according to
the same procedure as laid out above in the description of
Figure 2, only this time we condition the analysis on whether
FIGURE 2 | The local-national gap in perception of change by type of community. Proportion of sample who perceived something had changed.
FIGURE 1 | The local-national gap in perception of change as a result of the 2015 refugee crisis. Percent of sample who perceived something had changed.
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respondents lived in a local community that received a new ASC
during the refugee crisis or not. It shows as expected that
perception of change differs starkly in local communities with
and without new ASCs. The likelihood that respondents who
experienced the establishment of an ASC perceived that their
local community had changed as a result of the refugee crisis is
about 40%. By comparison, respondents living in local
communities that did not experience such establishments were
considerably less likely to perceive that their local community had
changed. The comparable figure is about 20%. That noted, in
neither type of community does a clear majority of respondents
perceive that their local community had changed, even if they
were aware that an ASC had been established there.
Turning now to consider the main question of the local-
national gap, Figure 3 reveals a remarkable pattern. Even in
those local communities that received an asylum center during
the refugee crisis, a much larger share of respondents perceived
that the country had changed than had their local community.
About 80% of respondents in both communities perceive change
when they were asked to consider the national setting.
Remarkably, even in those very local communities that hosted
the new asylum centers established in response to the refugee
crisis, the local-national gap remains both substantially and
statistically significant. A much larger share experienced
change “in the far” as opposed to “in the near.”
Experiment 2. Amount and Nature of
Discussion
In the second experiment, we asked respondents to evaluate the
amount and nature of discussion about refugees and
immigration. As before, we randomly varied whether
respondents were asked about their local community or about
Norway. We expected to find a local-national gap also in
perception of public discussions, where respondents would
perceive more and more conflict-oriented and divisive debates
when focusing on the question “in the far” compared to when
they focus on the question “in the near.”
Figure 4 displays the main results for the experiment on
amount of discussion. It brings out another sizable local-national
gap. The share of respondents who report public discussion about
immigration when the focus is on the national setting is around
70%. The share of respondents who report discussion about such
questions when their focus is on the local community is only 35%.
In other words, about twice as many respondents report some,
much, or very much discussion about refugees in the national
setting compared to the local one.
Turning to the analysis of the questions about the nature of
discussion in Figure 5 panels A–D, we see that the local-national
gap also extends to the nature of discussion about issues relating
to refugees and immigration. When focusing on the question in
the near, respondents are more likely to perceive the discussion as
calm (Panel A), unbiased (Panel B), and solution-oriented (Panel
C). When focusing on the question in the far, they are by contrast
more likely to perceive discussions about issues relating to
refugees and immigration as heated (Panel A), biased (Panel
B), and a source of conflict (Panel C). Only on one of the
dimensions do we not observe a local-national gap. As seen in
Panel D of Figure 5, there is no gap in evaluations on the question
of whether such discussion is interesting or boring. Respondents
are equally likely to perceive the discussion as interesting
regardless of setting.
Experiment 3. The Local-National Gap in
Sources of Information
In the final study, we dig deeper into the question of information
sources about refugees and immigration. We already established
FIGURE 3 | The local-national gap in perception of change by whether community received a new Asylum Seeker Center during the refugee crisis in 2015/6.
Proportion of sample who perceived something had changed.
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notable local-national gaps in public perception of change
following from the refugee crisis and public debate about
issues related to immigration. One plausible conjecture is that
this gap results from a difference in where members of the public
seek and receive information about refugees and immigration.
Systematic differences between the local and national setting in
information sources of the kind proposed in Blumer´s classic
account and discussed earlier would support this idea.
As described above, we examined this proposition in an open-
ended question where we asked respondents to record the sources
they rely on for information about refugees and immigration.
Following up the approach used throughout this study, we
randomly varied whether respondents were asked about the
local or the national setting. Nearly all respondents recorded
at least one source, and many recorded several. The responses
were manually coded by two researchers using a template adapted
from a previous study as described above (Wong et al., 2012).
Most responses fit easily into this template. A complete overview
of all cited sources is presented in the supplementary material
(Supplementary Table S6).
Table 3 below lays out the main results. The media (without
additional specifications) was mentioned as a source by the vast
FIGURE 4 | The local-national gap in perception of the amount of discussion about refugees and immigrants. Percent of sample who perceive very much, much, or
some discussion.
FIGURE 5 | The local-national gap in perception of the nature of discussion. Panel A. Calm vs. Heated. Direction and proportion of deviation frommidpoint. Panel B.
Unbiased vs. Biased, Direction and proportion of deviation from midpoint. Panel C. Solution-oriented vs. Conflict-generating. Direction and proportion of deviation from
midpoint. Panel D. Boring vs. Exciting. Direction and proportion of deviation from midpoint.
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majority in both experimental groups. That noted, there is a
considerable local-national gap in the share of respondents who
mention the media broadly as a source of information about
refugees and immigration. When asked about the national
setting, nearly all respondents, 9 out of 10, mention the media
as one of their sources. By contrast, when asked about the local
setting, a substantially smaller share of respondents, about two-
thirds, mention the media broadly as a source of information. The
difference is approximately 25 percentage points.
Respondents asked to focus on their local community weremore
likely than those asked about the national setting to cite specific local
media outlets, personal networks, and personal experiences and
observations as sources of information with respect to refugees and
immigration. In other words, we find that there are two kinds of
local-national gaps in sources of information. First, there is a gap
with respect to the likelihood of relying on social networks and
personal experiences and observations. Those asked about the local
community, are more likely to mention these types of sources than
are those asked about the national setting. Second, we identify a gap
in the type of media respondents mention. For the local setting,
respondents are considerably more likely to report specific local
media outlets as a source, while for the national setting local media
is not frequently mentioned. Interestingly, there is not a local-
national gap in the likelihood that social media is mentioned as a
source of information. About a third of respondents mention social
media in both conditions.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article we have dealt with an important but underexplored
puzzle. Why, when nativism is so important for the far-right vote,
do far-right parties underperform where natives and newcomers
live their everyday lives together? Immigrants live in local
communities. Voters and residents encounter immigrants
where they live, and this is where local authorities and local
organizations accommodate and integrate newcomers (Augustin
and Jørgensen, 2019; Søholt and Aasland, 2019; Campomori and
Ambrosini, 2020; Scalise and Burroni, 2020). We provided new
empirical insights into an aspect of intergroup attitudes that can
contribute to solving this puzzle. In three survey experiments, we
revealed that natives relate systematically differently to questions
concerning immigration and immigrants in local and national
settings. We suggest that this local-national gap in intergroup
attitudes is likely a part of the explanation for the
underperformance of the far right in local elections.
All studies have limitations. So does this one. While we know
from previous work that voting for the far right is strongly
associated with intergroup attitudes and while this study
demonstrates a local-national gap in intergroup attitudes, we
have not proven the link between these two phenomena at the
individual level. Doing so can be done, but will require a significant
investment in new longitudinal data-collection to track individuals
and their vote in (most often non-synchronous) local and national
elections. The new hypothesis emerging from the findings of this
study that could be tested on the individual-level is that those voters
who cause the local-national gap in intergroup attitudes are the ones
that are mainly responsible for the observed under-performance of
the far right in local elections. To our knowledge this hypothesis has
neither been posed nor tested before.
While we argue that it is likely that the local-national gap we
have demonstrated in intergroup attitudes play a part in
accounting for the observed local-national gap in far-right
electoral outcomes, we do not want to suggest that it is likely
to be the only explanation. In some countries, where the far-right
is less institutionalized, such as in Germany or Sweden, the gap in
electoral performance can be explained by supply side factors.
The Norwegian case studied here, however, strongly suggests that
the supply side is not the full explanation. The Norwegian far-
right is on all counts a fully institutionalized party, so the
persistent gap in electoral performance in local and national
elections needs additional explanations. We have advanced one
plausible alternative demand-side explanation here.
The main reason why we have proposed that it is likely that the
local-national gap we have identified in intergroup attitudes will
be relevant to the electoral outcomes of the far right is the strong
link shown in previous research between intergroup attitudes and
the far-right vote. That said, it should be noted that the items we
have examined here are not the conventional indicators of
nativism. Future studies should examine if the local-national
gap persists also across a wider variety of indicators of
nativism. Based on previous research, which finds strong
correlations across survey items probing attitudes about
immigrants and refugees, (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2008, Sniderman





Norway (n = 415) Local
community (n = 388)
Media (unspecified) 90.8% 64.7%
Network 34.5% 43.8%
Social media 31.3% 31.2%
Local media 15.9% 43.0%
Research and knowledge institutions 13.0% 7.7%
Personal experiences or observations 11.6% 20.6%
National media 8.2% 3.9%
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et al., 2001), one plausible conjecture is that local-national gaps
are common across items regardless of how they are phrased.
That said, it is an interesting and highly relevant question for
future research whether certain aspects of immigration is so
firmly entrenched as either a national or a local issue as to
counteract the disconnections between local and national
setting that we have documented here.
In future research, the finding reported here about different
sources of information for the local and national setting will likely
be central. Norway (like Finland and Sweden) has a strong local press,
both in terms of number of newspapers distributed and their
importance as disseminators of public information and discussions
(Allern and Pollack, 2019). Allern and Pollack (2019) foreground that
in this context local media plays an unparalleled role in monitoring
political decisions and public administration at the local level. We
found that respondents asked to focus on their local community were
more likely than those asked about the national setting to cite
personal networks, personal experiences and observations, and
local media as sources of information about refugees and
immigration. This result is in line with previous related research.
For example, a United States study found similar patterns regarding
sources people draw on to form perceptions of the racial composition
of their local community and the nation (Wong et al., 2012). The
reliance on local media as a source of information about the local
community is not surprising, but it is important especially in so far as
local and national media consistently differ in their coverage of
immigration-related news and themes.
Schmauch and Nygren’s (2020) analysis of local media
coverage of refugees and integration in Sweden showed that
a “threat frame” previously documented in analyses of national
media was largely absent in their material. Similarly, Hognestad
and Landmark (2017), who studied Norwegian local media
stories during the refugee crisis, point to fewer “problem
oriented” stories in their analyses, compared to previous
analyses of Norwegian national media. When our
respondents indicate that national debates are more heated,
conflictual, and biased than local debates, this may in part reflect
actual differences in media coverage of refugees and
immigration at the local and national levels. Our account
suggests that further research into such differences in media
coverage is warranted as they may be important both in
accounts of systematic variation in intergroup attitudes and
voting patterns in local and national settings.
Our tests of possible heterogeneous effects across different
types of local communities–urban, suburban, and rural–indicate
that the local-national gap in intergroup attitudes is not driven by
a dynamic associated with a particular type of local community.
Perhaps most striking is the fact that we observed the local-
national gap also among respondents who had an ASC
established in their local community. Also they, who
objectively speaking were most directly affected by the influx
of refugees, were more likely to think that changes had occurred if
they were asked about the national than about the local setting.
This pattern can only be understood if we allow for intergroup
attitudes in the national setting to be informed by something
other than local experiences. More specifically, the findings are
highly consistent with Blumer´s account of the construction of
immigrants as a symbolic threat “in the far.” A possible
implication of this line of argument is that not only
differences in information sources and media representations,
but also differences in political debates about immigration and
immigrants in national and local politics matters. Future research
should examine if the local-national gap documented here on the
level of citizens also extend to political leaders and elected
representatives.
As Blumer suggested, this should not be taken tomean that local
conditions are unimportant. This study was conducted in Norway,
a wealthy and well-organized democratic system where asylum
reception condition even during the refugee crisis were better than
inmany other places, especially perhaps in transit hot-spots further
South in Europe. Crowded and inhumane reception conditions
and protracted waiting could lead to more conflict and resentment
also at the local level than was observed in the context studied here,
and this could make intergroup attitudes in the local setting more
similar to those we have observed here for the national setting, and
in this way narrow the local-national gap. Further studies in other
contexts using the methodological approach established in this
study could examine these questions empirically. Above all, this
study underscores the importance in future studies of intergroup
attitudes and far right voting of carefully distinguishing between
local and national settings.
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